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CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS WITH A MULTISTATE
CLASS: A PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION
The importance of representative suits to consumer protection has
long been recognized." Not only is the class action particularly suited
to redress the typically small consumer claims arising from an abusive
business practice,2 but more importantly to deter future consumer ex-
ploitation.3 Nevertheless, there are two major obstacles preventing
the consumer class action from realizing its potential as a form of social
legislation.
First, like any class action, the consumer class action is procedur-
ally complex and time-consuming. Thus, as one commentator noted,
because federal courts have been so overwhelmed by problems of
management, there was not one nationwide consumer class action liti-
gated to conclusion within five years after the 1966 revision of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23).' Moreover, the methods
1. See generally Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part H1: Considerations of
Procedure, 49 B.U.L. Rv. 407 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Starrs].
2. The class action was born out of the need for a legal device to redress group
wrongs. Consequently, its intended function is to prevent a multiplicity of suits based
on the same wrongful act, as well as to provide relief to the group members whose
claims are so small that individual legal redress would be impractical. See generally
Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrv 199-242 (1950). Therefore, when a segment
of the consuming public is injured by some deceptive trade practice, a class action is
their best hope for recovery since typically their claims will be small. See Eckhardt,
Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw. 663 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Eck-
hardt].
3. "Arguably, the most positive result of class actions is the deterrent effect they
have on the harmful practices sometimes employed by manufacturers and retailers of
consumers goods. . . . Concerned that a class action could be brought, the producer
of consumer goods would undoubtedly be more sensitive to possible areas of liability.
Indeed, if the consumer action were successful, it is not unrealistic to predict that some
defendant producers and manufacturers would be faced with the possibility of going out
of business. In addition to the fear of costly litigation, the national manufacturer must
also recognize the potential for a tremendous loss in public goodwill if subjected to
a consumer action. No company would welcome the adverse publicity that accompa-
nies these suits." Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adju-
dications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1002,
1021-22 (1971) (citations omitted).
4. Id. at 1021. It should be noted that the revision of Rule 23, which governs
the conduct of class actions, did much to eliminate the restrictive tripartite classifica-
tions of class actions, "true," "hybrid" and "spurious," thereby rendering the class ac-
tion a more accessible device. Also, the courts were given wide discretion in their ad-
ministration of such actions. See 3B J. MooRE, FEDEaL PRACTICE 23 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE].
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adopted by one federal district court to facilitate the administration
of a large class action were overruled by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals and are now being reviewed by the Supreme Court.5 Should
the Court refuse to uphold the validity of these procedures, use of the
class action device on both the federal and state levels will be drasti-
cally curtailed. 6
The second, and perhaps the primary, reason why consumers
have been unable to take full advantage of the class action device is
that they lack a proper forum. In the typical consumer class action,7
the claims are relatively small, as well as separate and distinct.8 Addi-
tionally, the members of the class, usually residents of several states,9
were allegedly injured in their respective states due to some wrong-
ful activity on the part of a manufacturer or retailer doing business
nationwide. Consequently, because of the nature of their claims,
these consumer classes fail to satisfy the jurisdictional amount require-
ment of the federal courts. 10 Furthermore, their residential diversity
creates an obstacle to meeting requirements of state courts for in per-
sonam jurisdiction."
While the question of whether the value of class actions outweigh
their administrative difficulties is a valid and serious one, this note pro-
ceeds on the premise that until the class action is rendered totally in-
effective or until better means of public redress for group wrongs are
5. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414
U.S. 908 (1973). This decision represents the culmination of seven years of pre-liti-
gation concerning the administration of an action brought on behalf of millions of odd
lot investors.
6. At the risk of oversimplifying the issues in Eisen, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals found improper the proposed "fluid recovery" procedure and the use of a
preliminary "mini-hearing" on the merits in order to decide collateral issues such as
allocation of notice costs. Id. at 1011-12, 1015-16. The appellate court also held that
under certain circumstances, the class representative must defray the costs of notice
himself. Id. at 1009. While the Eisen class was uniquely immense and the majority
of its members unidentifiable, if the Second Circuit's findings are affirmed, the future
of class actions will be seriously threatened. Not only will potential class representa-
tives be reluctant to bring actions, but courts will hesitate to attempt the management
of a class along the lines of the seemingly practical Eisen procedures. For further dis-
cussion, see McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities
in Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, in this issue.
7. It is assumed for purposes of this article that the class action referred to is
a proper one as contemplated by Rule 23(b) (3), where the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting the in-
dividual members.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. The concept of residence, as used throughout this note, is synonymous with
that of domicile, the latter being the state where a person has his home. See M.
GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as GREEN].
10. See notes 15-27 & accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 73-76 & accompanying text infra.
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provided, 2 the class action device is invaluable. Resting on this sup-
position, the intention of this note is to discuss and to propose a solution
to the typical consumer class' unique jurisdictional problem, lack of
a proper forum. The note begins with an analysis of the problem on
the federal level. It will be shown that although there are theoretic-
ally two possible methods by which a consumer class can satisfy the
jurisdictional amount requirement, the Supreme Court has recently
taken the final step in virtually closing the doors of federal courts to
this type of class. 13 Since the future of multistate consumer class ac-
tions therefore depends on their maintenance in state courts, it will
be necessary to discuss how a state court can assume jurisdiction over
class members residing outside its jurisdictional boundaries and there-
by render a binding judgment over the entire class.' 4 An attempt will
be made to answer this question by referring to the manner in which
state courts submit foreign defendants to their jurisdiction. However,
because these methods are not easily adapted to plaintiff consumer
classes, this note will conclude with the proposition that, subject to cer-
tain practical limitations, due process of law allows a state court to
hear a multistate class action without any need to strain traditional
jurisdictional principles.
12. Unfortunately, governmental agencies have demonstrated an incapacity to
carry the entire burden of consumer protection. Set up to implement the provisions
of an act, they are notoriously slow in establishing official standards. See, e.g., Com-
ment, Drug Elficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEo. L.i. 185 (1971). Also,
because most agencies are understaffed and insufficiently funded, they are able to focus
their efforts on only a small percentage of the violations coming to their attention.
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. &
COMM. L. Rav. 501, 508 (1969). Moreover, even when an agency attempts to police
violations of an act, such action can often be ineffective. See, e.g., Eckhardt, supra
note 2, at 667 (FTC actions against the Holland Furnace Co.). For an in depth
analysis of the inadequacies of the Federal Trade Commission, the chief governmental
consumer advocate, see E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. ScH=z, THE NADER REPORT ON
ma FTC (1969). J /
13. See notes 15-27 & accompanying text infra.
14. It is not intended to detract from the importance of state consumer class ac-
tions where the classes are composed of residents of one state. Undoubtedly, they are
effective in deterring unlawful practices, particularly those of local businesses. How-
ever, because there will be times when the interests of consumer protection require an
adjudication of a multistate action, the jurisdictional problem involved mandates singu-
lar treatment since it is not a concern in a purely local class action. See text accom-
panying notes 73-76 infra.
Furthermore, while the primary focus of this note is on class actions at law, the
benefits of relief in equity are not overlooked, particularly with regard to injunctions,
specific performance and rescission of contracts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
there are many consumer abuses which may not give rise to actions sounding solely
in equity. Moreover, injunctions, serving merely to correct existing wrongs, are often
ineffectual in impeding future wrongs. It is therefore essential for consumer classes
to be able to resort with some consistency to courts which will grant damages based
on their separate and distinct claims.
May 1974]
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Federal Consumer Class Actions:
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement
"The promise of the federal class action was nipped in the bud
by the unfortunate decision in Snyder v. Harris."'5  In that case, the
named class representative claimed $8,740 in damages, although the
aggregate amount claimed on behalf of the class was $1,200,000.16
The Supreme Court held that in a diversity action, class members may
not aggregate their separate and distinct claims in order to satisfy the
federal jurisdictional amount requirement.17  Moreover, in the recent
case of Zahn v. International Paper Co.,"8 following Snyder's ration-
ale, 9 the Court denied maintenance of a class action where, although
the named class representatives satisfied the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement, other class members' claims fell below the monetary prereq-
uisite. In both decisions, the Court invoked "the well-established
rule that each of several plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct claims
must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement if his claim [is] to
survive a motion to dismiss.120  Consequently, in order to maintain
a class action based on diversity jurisdiction, not only must the named
class representative claim damages in excess of $10,000, but so must
each class member. Thus, because most injured consumers seldom
have claims exceeding $10,000, Snyder and Zahn effectively deny the
consumer class access to the federal forum through diversity jurisdic-
tion,2' even though the class as a whole may have sustained damages
representing millions of dollars.22
15. Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm. on Consumer Protec-
tion of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1970) (remarks
by Jay Dushoff), citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
16. 394 U.S. at 333.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). For a complete discussion of Snyder's effect on
federal class actions, including the resurrection of the tripartite classification of class
actions, see Strausberg, Class Actions and Jurisdictional Amount: Access to a Federal
Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 79 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Strausberg]. See note 1 supra.
18. 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
19. Id. at 511.
20. Id. The Zahn Court noted that this rule was rooted in a long series of cases
dating from 1832 and construing the statutory phrase, "matter in controversy," of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332 (1970). Id. at 508-09.
21. It is the jurisdictional amount requirement which closes the door, for diversity
is easily established in a class action. Diversity is determined by the citizenship of
the named class representative and the defendant, and cannot be defeated by class
members having the same citizenship as the opposing party. Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
22. A rare exception would be when the damages claimed represent an amount
in which the class shares a common and undivided interest, as opposed to damages rep-
resenting the separate and distinct claims of the class members. See Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505, 508 (1973). Similarly, neither Snyder nor Zahn
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Absent recourse through diversity jurisdiction, the consumer
class' alternative route to the federal courts is through federal question
jurisdiction. 23  The Snyder Court did not explicitly extend its holding
to federal question cases. However, in stating that "[a] large part
of those matters involving federal questions can be brought, by way
of class action or otherwise, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy,"' 24 -the Court implied that class actions based on federal laws
not exempted from the jurisdictional amount requirement would be
subject to the Snyder no-aggregation rule. Accordingly, Snyder be-
came a bar to a number of subsequent federal question cases.2 5 Fin-
ally, in Zahn, the Court announced in dictum that a class action invok-
ing federal question jurisdiction is subject to the same jurisdictional
amount requirement with respect to separate and distinct claims as one
brought under diversity jurisdiction.2 However, despite this pro-
nouncement, the Zahn Court still maintained that the impact of Snyder
and Zahn upon federal question cases would be negligible because
"Congress has exempted major areas of federal question jurisdiction
from any jurisdictional amount requirements ....
Unfortunately, among the federal statutes which provide for pri-
vate right of action without reference to the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement, there are very few which are appropriate for consumer
litigation. 28 Of note are the Clayton29 and Truth in Lending 6 Acts,
forecloses a diversity class action seeking only injunctive relief, as the amount in con-
troversy of such an action is generally measured as "the value to be protected or the
extent of the injury to be prevented." Marquez v. Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364, 1370
(N.D. Cal. 1969).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
24. 394 U.S. at 341.
25. Class suits based on the following federal questions were dismissed because
of impermissibility of aggregation. Federal housing: Potrero Hill Community Action
Comm. v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 410 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1969); Mat-
tingly v. Elias, 325 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Constitutionality of state statute:
Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S.
397 (1970). Validity of action by federal government: Opelika Nursing Home v.
Richardson, 323 F. Supp. 1206 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Fraudulent national sales referral
scheme: Schuler v. Family Buying Power, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
26. 94S. Ct. at 512 n.1l.
27. Id.
28. See Johnson v. New York State Education Dept., 319 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) where jurisdiction was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3) (1970), which provide for original jurisdiction of federal district courts in
cases involving deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law or an act
of Congress.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1970). 'The broad sweep of the antitrust laws for-
bids anti-competitive consumer abuses such as price fixing, territorial division agree-
ments, and tying agreements, as well as the more generalized wrongs of monopoly and
attempts to monopolize. . . . Certainly, for the consumer advocate, the antitrust laws
constitute a potent weapon for particularly grave abuses. . . ." Krahmer, Some Prob-
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which are extremely helpful to consumers injured by antitrust violations
or deceptive credit practices. Moreover, it should be emphasized that
because the Clayton Act provides for treble damages, as well as costs
of suit and reasonable attorney fees, 31 a successful class suit under this
act would undoubtedly have the desired impact of deterring future
offenses.
The federal question actions available to the consumer class can
provide relief for only a small portion of the wide variety of consumer
abuses. Therefore, as a means of access to the federal forum, federal
question jurisdiction is a limited solution to the problems of consumer
classes unable to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. How-
ever, other solutions which have been proposed to mitigate the effect
of Snyder prove to be even less promising.
"Defendant's View" Doctrine for Determining Jurisdictional Amount
The "defendant's view" doctrine is a method of determining the
amount in controversy in a law suit. Under this doctrine, the amount
in controversy is valued as the "pecuniary result to either party which
the judgment would directly produce. '32  This doctrine developed
concurrently with the "plaintiffs view" doctrine, the traditional test for
determining jurisdictional amount. Under the latter, the amount in
controversy is measured by the amount which the plaintiff in good
faith pleads in his complaint.33
It has been urged by one commentator that because it has never
been settled which doctrine is applicable in determining jurisdictional
amount, the courts are free to choose either doctrine.34 If a court
"chose" to follow the "defendant's view" doctrine in a consumer class
action, Snyder would obviously be averted, since the "pecuniary result"
would represent the aggregate of the class' claims or, put another way,
the total amount the defendant would stand to lose. In Berman v.
Narragansett Racing Association,35 the court of appeals for the first
circuit adopted this doctrine as an alternative ground for its decision
lems of Consumer Class Actions, 7 U. Ricm. L. REv. 213, 217-18 (1972) (citations
omitted).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
32. Ronzio v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
33. For a complete discussion of both doctrines, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 124 et seq. (2d ed. 1970).
34. Strausberg, supra note 17, at 104. "Mhe Supreme Court has implicitly
adopted each doctrine at two different points in time." Id. However, the latter of the
two opinions came fifty years after the first and clearly upheld the "plaintiff's view"
doctrine. Id., citing St. Paul Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1937) (plaintiff's
view) and Adam v. Smith, 130 U.S. 167 (1889) (defendant's view).
35. 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
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to maintain a class action, and thereby permitted aggregation of the
class members' claims in satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement.3 6 The court's first ground for maintaining the action was
that the class shared a common and undivided interest in the damages
claimed.371 Thus, since the class members were not found to have
separate and distinct claims, aggregation was permissible even under
Snyder.38 Nevertheless, it has been noted that while the "defendant's
view" doctrine was unnecessary to the court's holding, "[t]he court
went to great lengths to [maintain the class action, and] [i]n so do-
ing. . . circumvented the purpose of the Snyder no aggregation rule
",39
Berman is the only post-Snyder case to use the "defendant's
view" doctrine in a class action. Indeed, with the exception of the
first circuit, the federal courts have shown little inclination to disregard
Snyder's bar against aggregation 4 0 -even in federal question cases.
41
Moreover, in view of the Zahn Court's recent and emphatic endorse-
ment of Snyder,42 even if courts actually do have a choice between
the "plaintiff's" or "defendant's view" doctrines in determining jurisdic-
tional amount, it is improbable that they will opt for the latter in a
typical consumer class action.
Ancillary (Pendent) Jurisdiction
In their respective dissents to Zahn, Justice Brennan43 and Judge
Timbers44 of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals contended that the
issue was not aggregation of class members' claims, but rather ancil-
lary jurisdiction. Actually, both jurists were more likely referring to
pendent jurisdiction, a subcategory of ancillary jurisdiction. Under
pendent jurisdiction, viewing the matter from the plaintiff's perspec-
tive, a federal court may assert jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim
which is "pendent" to the jurisdiction-granting claim already before
the court.45 Agreeing that as a means of establishing jurisdiction,
36. Id. at 315.
37. Id. at 315-17. Berman was a class suit against a racetrack for withholding
distribution of money to purse winners pursuant to an alleged agreement.
38. See note 22 supra.
39. Strausberg, supra note 17, at 105.
40. See, eg., Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription
Service, Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1 (8th Cir. 1970) (suggesting application of "defend-
ant's view" doctrine to class actions would directly contravene Snyder); Lonnquist v.
J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970) (in an action factually similar to Ber-
man, court found claims of class separate and distinct).
41. See note 25 supra.
42. See note 56 & accompanying text infra.
43. 94 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1973).
44. 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (1972).
45. GREEN, supra note 9, at 23-25. The test of pendency has been refined in
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aggregation is barred when plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims,
Justice Brennan added:
[T]he "aggregation" rule has been but one of several ways to
establish jurisdiction over additional claims and parties ...
Ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that cannot be
fitted within the aggregation rules has long been recognized by this
Court .... -416
Justice Brennan then went on to give examples of how the Court
has previously sustained the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over com-
pulsory counterclaims, intervention as a matter of right, cross-claims
permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g), impleaded de-
fendants, and defendants interpleaded under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 22.17  Further, the justice emphasized how ancillary juris-
diction has long been sustained in class actions where the nonappear-
ing class members do not meet the rule of complete diversity between
parties plaintiff and defendant. 48  Critically questioning the majority's
refusal to consider ancillary jurisdiction in cases such as Zahn, where
absent class members fail to meet the jurisdictional amount require-
ment, he concluded:
Particularly in view of the constitutional background on which the
statutory diversity requirements are written . . . it is difficult to
understand why the practical approach the Court took [in sustain-
ing ancillary jurisdiction over non-diverse absent class members]
must be abandoned where the purely statutory "matter in contro-
versy" [jurisdictional amount] requirement is concerned. 49
Therefore, as the Zahn minority would have it,50 once the named class
representative meets the jurisdictional amount requirement, ancillary
jurisdiction could be established over the other members of the class
without regard to the size of their claims. Obviously, this would be
a workable solution to the jurisdictional problem of the consumer class,
provided it had a proper representative who could assert a claim over
$10,000.51
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966): "The state and federal
claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered with-
out regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then assuming sub-
stantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole."
A Rule 23(b)(3) action would undoubtedly meet this test, since it must be based on
questions of law or fact common to all the members of the class. See note 7 supra.
The Gibbs Court further emphasized that it is an exercise of a court's discretion
whether to sustain ancillary jurisdiction over the non-federal claim. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, supra, at 725.
46. 94 S. Ct. at 513-14.
47. Id. at 514.
48. Id. at 515. See note 21 supra.
49. Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
50. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent.
51. Due to the fact that under this theory of jurisdiction, the named representa-
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The federal district court for the northern district of Illinois al-
lowed a class action to proceed on the basis just described. In Lesch
v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co.,52 a diversity class action,
this court held:
[I]n a spurious class action, if one of the representative parties
has a claim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum then federal
jurisdiction attaches, and if that party alone can adequately repre-
sent the entire class, then there is federal jurisdiction over the en-
tire class action even where members of the class having smaller
claims are originally named parties. 53
It should be noted, however, that Lesch was a pre-Snyder case. 4
More importantly, Lesch appears to run directly contrary to the sub-
sequently expressed mandates of Zahn. Yet, the Zahn Court did not
once mention the propriety or impropriety of ancillary jurisdiction in
the context of satisfying the jurisdictional amount requirement in a
Rule 23 action, even though the issue was raised by the petitioning
class."5 Thus, by virtue of this omission, technically Lesch has not
been overruled.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the Supreme Court's ada-
mant refusal to overrule Snyder or to change the long-standing con-
struction of "matter in controversy. ' 56  Clearly, this extreme posture,
coupled with a conspicuous silence on the matter of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, would indicate the jurisdictional amount issue in diversity federal
class actions will be governed solely by the aggregation rules. Con-
sequently, although the question of whether or not to sustain ancillary
jurisdiction in an appropriate action is within the discretion of the fed-
tive must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement, the usefulness of ancillary juris-
diction to a consumer class would depend largely on the nature of the abuse being com-
plained of. For example, in a products liability action, where members of the class
have actually sustained physical injuries, it is probable that a class representative could
be found to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. However, in a false adver-
tisement action, it is unlikely any individual class member could complain of substan-
tial damages.
52. 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. 111. 1968).
53. Id. at 912.
54. It should also be noted that the Lesch court based their holding, perhaps er-
roneously, on a Supreme Court case which addressed itself to the effect of ancillary
jurisdiction on diversity jurisdiction, not on the jurisdictional amount requirement. Id.,
citing Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
55. See 94 S. Ct. at 514 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 512. "From the outset, Congress has provided that suits between citi-
zens of different States are maintainable in the district courts only if the 'matter in
controversy' exceeds the statutory minimum, now set at $10,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)." Id. at 507-08 (footnote omitted). In construing the "matter in contro-
versy" in actions where there are several claimants, each with separate and distinct
claims, courts have consistently held that each claimant must meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Id. at 508-11.
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eral judges,1 7 it is highly unlikely any federal court would follow Lesch
and exercise such discretion in order to maintain a typical consumer
class action.
Overruling Snyder
It is apparent that apart from the limited number of federal ques-
tion actions appropriate to consumer litigation, 58 there is no feasible
method of circumventing Snyder and Zahn in order to procure a fed-
eral forum for the consumer class. Thus, for the federal judiciary to
play a major role in consumer protection, the Snyder rule must be
overruled by the Supreme Court or changed by Congress.
As previously noted, the Supreme Court is not at all inclined to
overrule Snyder.59 At first glance, assuming the need of class actions,
the Court's dedication to uphold the Snyder rationale seems entirely
unreasonable. Obviously, class actions in which each class member
can assert a claim over $10,000 do not arise often. Nor is it often
that a group of claims are sufficiently interrelated to constitute a com-
mon and undivided interest. Thus, the great majority of prospective
class litigants, if unable to unite their various claims in state class ac-
tions, are forced to pursue their causes individually, either on the fed-
eral or state level depending on the size of their claims. Not only
is this economically unfeasible for those potential litigants with smaller
claims, but it is also productive of a multitude of suits. It was to avoid
this very result that the class action device was originally formulated.6 °
Hence, Snyder greatly undermines the usefulness of Rule 23. Finally,
a review of Justice Brennan's dissent in Zahn immediately reveals that
application of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine to the jurisdictional
amount requirement in class actions would be not only valid, but also
totally in line with the Court's development of that doctrine.'
Yet, upon closer scrutiny, the Supreme Court's continued adher-
ence to Snyder may not appear so unreasonable. It is clear that the
Court believes that the above mentioned inequities are outweighed by
the inescapable conclusion that to dispense with the Snyder rule would
open the federal courts to an entirely new body of litigation, namely
large and complex diversity class actions based exclusively on state
law. This inevitability and the resultant burden it would place on
the federal courts were instrumental factors in the Snyder Court's rul-
ing.62 Although the Court declined to reiterate this policy considera-
57. See note 45 supra.
58. See notes 28-30 & accompanying text supra.
59. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
60. See note 2 supra.
61. See notes 46-49 & accompanying text supra.
62. 394 U.S. at 339-41.
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tion in Zahn, there is little doubt it was influential to that decision as
well.6 3 Even if the Supreme Court were not completely convinced
that this last consideration outweighed the value of federal diversity
class actions, it would have to consider the potential reaction of the
federal judiciary to an onslaught of diversity class actions. If a federal
judge were faced with such a burdensome increase in his caseload,
it is not unreasonable to assume he might exercise the broad discre-
tion granted him by Rule 23 and drastically curtail the use of the class
action device. Rather than have the courts chip away at Rule 23
piecemeal, the court chose to relieve them of that task with Snyder.
Thus, it is evident that the Supreme Court has no intention of
relaxing or altering the Snyder doctrine in the future and that if such
change is to come, it must be from Congress. 64  However it is equally
doubtful that legislative rejection of Snyder will be forthcoming. Only
one month after Snyder was decided, Senator Tydings introduced a
bill entitled Class Action Jurisdiction Act (CAlA).65 It was designed,
in part, to overcome Snyder by dispensing with the jurisdictional
amount requirement in all consumer class actions based on alleged
violations of consumer rights affecting interstate commerce. 66 CAJA
set off a chain of proposed bills, all similarly motivated to aid the con-
sumer class by alleviating the jurisdictional problem, yet each differing
in its approach.67 Significantly, none of these bills survived the legis-
63. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, remarks that it was indeed the Court's "ap-
parent purpose" to refrain from overburdening the federal judiciary. 94 S. Ct. at 514.
64. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1973).
65. S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). A companion bill was introduced by
Representative Eckhardt. H.R. 11656, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Both Congress-
men discuss consumer class action legislation. Eckhardt, supra note 2; Tydings, The
Private Bar-Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NoTIE DAME LAW. 478
(1970).
66. S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § (b) (3) (1969).
67. First, CAJA and its companion bill were refined and amended by S. 3092,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and H.R. 14585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), which went
to the respective Commerce Committees of each body. See note 65 supra. Also intro-
duced in the Commerce Committees were the Administration bills, S. 3201, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969) and H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), adding a prerequisite
"triggering device" under which the Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission
must obtain a cease and desist order in the district court before a consumer may bring
action. The Administration's House bill was ultimately amended to include, among
other provisions, a jurisdictional amount requirement over $25,000, which could repre-
sent the aggregate of the class' claims providing each member's loss exceeded $10.00.
H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301(d), 302(b)(1) (1969). The House bill fi-
nally recommended in the 91st Congress retained this requirement, but provided that
the Federal Trade Commission would make general rules, violations of which could
give rise to private consumer class actions, in lieu of the "triggering device." H.R.
14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (Comm. Print Showing H.R. 14931 as Ordered Re-
ported by Subcomm. June 2, 1970).
Of additional interest is Charles Alan Wright's response to the Congressional con-
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lative session,"8 and to date no bill which would effectively dispense
with the Snyder rule, at least as it affects consumer class actions, has
been enacted.69
There are many reasons why Congress has not reached agree-
ment on suitable legislation in this area. No doubt, the legislature
is influenced by the same considerations as the Supreme Court-the
overloading of the federal dockets and the bench's reaction. How-
ever, perhaps the most significant stumbling block is the difficulty in
achieving a practical balance between the federal and state substantive
law to be incorporated in the proposed legislation. Most of the pro-
posals would have allowed federal class suits based on violations of
any state statutory or decisional laws, as well as on violations of federal
laws. 70  There is no question of Congress' power to adopt state law
as federal law. 1  But its failure to do so in the area of consumer ac-
tions reflects Congressional reluctance to incorporate into federal legis-
lation such an expansive field of law which has heretofore been within
the domain of state interest.
Thus, an analysis of consumer class treatment on the federal level
inevitably leads to a question of policy: are the federal courts, under
diversity jurisdiction, the preferable forum for consumer class actions
based on state law? Through their continued support of the Snyder
doctrine, the federal judiciary and legislature have answered in the
cern over Snyder. Instead of special consumer legislation, Professor Wright recom-
mended the following addition to 28 U.S.C. § 1332: "In any case permitted to be
maintained as a class action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the aggregate
claims for or against all members of the class shall be regarded as the amount in con-
troversy." Letter from Charles Alan Wright to The Honorable Joseph D. Tydings,
June 17, 1969.
68. The proposed bills cited in the preceding note were "revived" in altered form
in the next Congress by the following bills, which also expired with session: S. 984,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), allowing con-
sumers private judicial action subject to their respective provisions, without regard to
jurisdictional amount; S. 1378, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and companion bill H.R.
5630, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), retaining the requirement that a class' aggregate
claim must exceed $25,000. For a complete discussion of these bills, see Newberg,
Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation: Making the System Work, 9 HAv J.
LEGIS. 217 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Newberg].
69. In fact, one of the most recent and significant pieces of consumer protection
legislation on the federal level allowing private legal action explicitly requires the in-
jured party to establish the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081, § 2072 (Supp. If, 1972).
70. E.g., CAJA, S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 14931, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969). See Comment, Consumer Protection-The Class Action Jurisdiction
Act, 44 TUL. L. REv. 580 (1970), discussing the constitutional problems posed by
CAJA's provision to allow suits based on state law in federal court without regard to
jurisdictional amount or diversity of citizenship.
71. See Eckhardt, supra note 2, at 675-76.
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negative. Consequently, if the great majority of consumer classes are
to find a forum, it must be the state courts.
72
State Consumer Actions: In Personam Jurisdiction
Where subject matter jurisdiction was the consumer class' road-
block to the federal forum, the question of the power to exercise that
jurisdiction over the parties is the obstacle to overcome in the state
courts. 73  In order for a person to be bound by a state court's judg-
ment affecting his legal rights, he must be subject to the adjudicating
court's jurisdiction. Remembering that the type of consumer class
under discussion is multistate in character, the question then becomes
how does a state court assume jurisdiction and render a binding judg-
ment in a consumer class action when there are members of the class
residing outside its jurisdictional boundaries.74 With the exception of
two unique circumstances which will be mentioned later,7 5 this has not
yet been done by any state court.
Ordinarily, there is no in personam jurisdiction problem with par-
ties plaintiff. They voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of a court
when they file their complaints. However, this cannot be said of a
plaintiff class, for it is only the class representative who comes before
the court. Furthermore, the representative's act of filing cannot rea-
sonably imply the class' consent to the court's jurisdiction, since, at
the commencement of a class suit, most class members are totally un-
aware that the representative intends to involve them in the pending
litigation. Of course, this is true even in suits brought on behalf of
a class composed entirely of residents of the forum state. Neverthe-
less, in such "local" actions, if a court, after a review of the pleadings,
is satisfied that the facts alleged indicate the propriety of a class action,
it will allow the suit to proceed toward litigation. It is extremely
doubtful, however, even under the argument later posed by this arti-
cle, that any state court would summarily acknowledge jurisdiction in
a multistate class action upon the mere filing of proper pleadings.
It is therefore apparent that the multistate consumer class action
presents a novel issue in terms of in personam jurisdiction. However,
an action involving nonresident plaintiff class members raises essenti-
72. The Snyder Court itself said, referring specifically to class actions: "Suits in-
volving issues of state law and brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship can often
be most appropriately tried in state courts." 394 U.S. at 341.
73. The class action contemplated by this note would undoubtedly meet the juris-
dictional amount requirement of any state court.
74. Naturally, assuming the requisites of a class action were met, a state court
would have the power to bind those class members who are residents of the forum
state. However, this question contemplates a binding judgment over the entire class,
residents and nonresidents alike.
75. See notes 80 and 98-104 & accompanying text infra.
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ally the same jurisdictional problem as one involving a nonresident de-
fendant. In both situations, unless a court can validly exercise juris-
diction over the foreign parties, it will dismiss an action which seeks
to determine their legal rights. 6 Yet, while multistate class actions
are novel, state courts have long been confronted with actions brought
against nonresident defendants. Consequently, out of these cases
have developed jurisdictional principles which allow courts to obtain
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant or, in the alternative,
to obtain jurisdiction over the property of a foreign defendant, and
in both cases to render a judgment that will bind him. It may there-
fore be initially instructive to determine if any of these principles can
be applied to nonresident consumer class members.
Minimum Contacts Theory
The most common method of acquiring in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant absent from the forum state is based on the mini-
mum contacts theory.77  The theory operates when the foreign defen-
dant has had sufficient contact with the forum state that would justify
subjecting him to its jurisdiction.7 8  An obvious application of the
minimum contacts theory is when a court assumes jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who has allegedly committed a wrongful act
within the forum state.' The two possible circumstances where this
dimension of the theory could be applied to a nonresident consumer
class member both require the latter's presence in the forum state in
connection with the events giving rise to the class action. First, in
an action where the foreign consumer is damaged in the forum state
by the alleged wrongful activity, he has had sufficient contact with that
state on which to base in personam jurisdiction.80 Secondly, if, for
76. It is important here to understand that a class action does indeed attempt to
affect the legal rights of a plaintiff class member, just as any action attempts to impose
legal liabilities on a defendant. Put very simply, if a group of persons have been in-
jured in the eyes of the law by a single act or activity, they will each have a valid
cause of action which may be brought individually by any one of them. Yet, when
one of these persons seeks to bring an action on behalf of the entire group, he is taking
the matter out of the individuals' hands. Therefore, assuming the class proceeds prop-
erly to a final decree, whatever the outcome, the class members no longer have a legal
right to bring their own actions, since under the principle of res judicata the matter
will have been settled. See GREEN, supra note 9, at 212-13.
77. The minimum contacts theory began with International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where the court announced: "[D]ue process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.' " Id. at 316.
78. Id.
79. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
80. Cf. Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr.
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example, in a products liability action, each foreign consumer actually
purchased the allegedly defective product in the forum state, the
necessary contact would be established even though the consumer
may discover the defect or be physically injured by the product once
outside the forum state.81 However, neither of these situations would
arise often enough to qualify this aspect of the minimum contacts the-
ory as a significant solution to the present problem.
A more liberal aspect of the theory is presented when the non-
resident defendant, without having been in the forum state, is party
to a transaction with the resident plaintiff and the transaction is the
subject matter of the litigation. This aspect of the minimum contacts
theory was established by McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.
8 2
In that case, the defendant had issued and mailed an insurance policy
to the plaintiff, a California resident, and the two parties continued
an exchange of premium notices and payments through the mail."3
The Supreme Court upheld this extremely de minimis contact by the
defendant insurance company with the forum state, California, as suffi-
cient to justify in personam jurisdiction.84
The findings of McGee may be useful where a class alleges in-
juries in connection with installment contracts, or less formal sequen-
tial payments, for the purchase of goods from the defendant company,
a resident of the forum state.85 Like an insurance contract, an install-
ment contract calls for a continuous flow of correspondence and money
payments between the parties to the contract throughout the duration
of the contract. Applying McGee, a court could justifiably conclude
that transactions pursuant to such contracts are as extensive, if not
more so, than those which occurred between McGee and the insur-
ance company.
However, it is not the quantitative nature of the contact alone
which is important. In Hanson v. Denckla,86 the Supreme Court held
724 (1967) (class action by a taxicab customer on behalf of himself and all other simi-
larly situated, including nonresidents of California, to recover excessive charges by the
company for use of its cabs in southern California over a four year period).
81. Although there are no cases involving this particular set of circumstances, the
trend toward expansion of in personam jurisdiction indicates that jurisdiction based on
such contact would "not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See GREEN,
supra note 9, at 23-47.
82. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
83. Id. at 221-22.
84. Id. at 223.
85. This particular type of controversy is not uncommon subject matter for class
action. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1971) (class action seeking rescission of installment contracts for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation).
86. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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that the lower court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant was invalid, even though the latter's contacts
with the forum state were similar to8 7 and perhaps quantitatively as
great as88 those of the defendant in McGee. "The crucial distinction
between [McGee and Hanson] seems to be that in McGee the con-
tacts . . . were initiated by the [nonresident] defendant, whereas in
Hanson they were not."8 9 Thus, the Hanson Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant pur-
posefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws. 90
It would therefore appear that Hanson limits application of the mini-
mum contacts theory of McGee to situations where the nonresident
defendant initiated the contact with the forum state.
In the context of the class action under discussion, this qualifica-
tion would bar inclusion of any nonresident class member who had
not initiated the transaction with the resident defendant sales com-
pany.' It is reasonable to conceive of situations where the consumer
is indeed the first to pursue a transaction with an out-of-state retailer,
discounting the latter's general advertisement program. Nevertheless,
it is questionable whether under these circumstances it could be said
that the consumer purposefully availed himself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the retailer's state and thereby invoked the
benefits and protection of that state's laws. It would be a nice point
to argue should the exact situation arise, but, again, this approach of
acquiring jurisdiction over a multistate class only touches upon one
particular type of consumer abuse and one very restrictive group of
permissible nonresident class members.
Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
Another means by which a state court may bind a nonresident
defendant by its judgment is to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the
defendant's property. A proceeding in rem can be maintained with-
87. In Hanson, the testatrix, who had been a resident of the forum state, Florida,
and had executed the trust which was the subject matter of the litigation, had consider-
able correspondence with the defendant trustee, resident of Delaware.
88. GREEN, supra note 9, at 32.
89. Id.
90. 357 U.S. at 253.
91. In a situation where a company is accused of widespread misconduct in con-
nection with installment contracts, it is not unlikely that the company actively solicited
its customers' business, perhaps through a fraudulent sales scheme.
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out obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant because it is the
defendant's property, and not the defendant himself, which is subject
to the court's jurisdiction." It is essential, however, that this property,
the res, be present within the territorial boundaries of the court.93
If the action is a true in rem proceeding, the judgment is binding
on all the world as to the particular property." More common, how-
ever, is an action quasi in rem which merely seeks to determine the
status of some property as between the named parties and whose
judgment binds only those who were party to and received notice of
the action, whatever their states of residency.95 Thus, theoretically,
in a class action quasi in rein, if the class were well defined and its
members received notice of the action,9 6 the class, including any non-
residents of the forum state, would be bound by the judgment.
97
There have been quasi in rem class actions which included non-
resident class members, some of whom were later found to be bound
by the class action decisions. These actions involved as the res, insur-
ance funds, and their holdings were found to be determinative of is-
sues concerning the same funds in subsequent actions. In these latter
actions, known as the common fund cases, 98 the respective courts
found that the various plaintiffs were members of the classes, and
therefore bound by the judgments of the prior actions, despite the fact
that the prior actions were conducted in states other than those of the
plaintiffs' residencies. 99 Though none of the courts in the original
92. Of course, in rem jurisdiction does not exist solely for the purpose of main-
taining an action despite the absence of a defendant. In rem jurisdiction is established
any time a judgment is sought to fix the status of property, personal or real. In per-
sonam jurisdiction, on the other hand, is necessary when a suit seeks to establish the
parties' rights and duties as between themselves. See GREEN, supra note 9, at 26-43.
93. Id. at 36.
94. Id. at 36-37.
95. Id. at 37.
96. As will be noted later, all Rule 23(b) (3)-type actions require some form of
notice to the class members. See text accompanying notes 142-151 infra. However,
there may be some question of whether provisions for notifying class members would
meet the requirements for actual or constructive notice in in rem proceedings. Keeping
in mind that the latter requirement is to insure notice to the party whose property is
being affected, while notice to class members is to inform them that a suit has been filed
on their behalf and they may be excluded if so desired, the strict notice requirements of
class action law would most likely suffice in an in rem class action.
97. This assumes that all other requisites for the maintenance of a class action
are met.
98. E.g., Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66
(1938); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Supreme Council of the
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
99. For example, in the leading common fund case, Hartford Life Insurance Co.
v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915), a Minnesota resident insured by Hartford was held bound
by a prior Connecticut court judgment against a class of Connecticut policyholders who
challenged Hartford's right to increase premiums.
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class suits discussed the binding effects of their judgments on the non-
resident class members, the question was necessarily raised in the sub-
sequent actions in the context of giving full faith and credit to the
prior decisions of other state courts.100 Most of the common fund de-
cisions stressed that the original forums had an overriding interest in
determining the status of insurance funds maintained and administered
in their respective states.' It was further pointed out that such an
interest allowed those forums to exercise extended jurisdictional
power.'0 2 However, a different justification for extraterritorial juris-
diction was urged in one of the later common fund cases."0 3 Rather
than relying on the common fund aspects of the controversy, that case
emphasized the nature of an insurance company dispute as it affects
public interests.'
The precedential value of the common fund cases to consumer
classes is questionable. On the one hand, these cases suggest that if
a class were seeking to establish its rights in a res imbued with the
characteristics of a common fund and located within the forum state,
a decision as to those rights would be binding on the entire class. Yet,
on the other hand, unless there appears to be a special interest in-
volved in the action, the forum state lacks any justification for extend-
ing its jurisdiction. As will be noted later, regardless of whether the
action is in personam or quasi in rem, when a court exercises jurisdic-
tion beyond traditional limitations, it has usually found special interests
compelling it to do so. 1°5 It will also be shown that consumer class
actions may involve any number of interests which would justify extra-
territorial jurisdiction.10 6  Therefore, the significant distinction be-
tween the class actions which were determinative of the common fund
decisions and typical consumer class actions is that the latter generally
do not seek to establish a class' shared and undivided claim to a spec-
ific source of funds. On the contrary, the claims of a consumer class,
while based on common questions of law and fact, are usually separate
and distinct'07 and can be satisfied by any of the defendant's assets.
Consequently, in order for a consumer class to take advantage of the
100. See, e.g., Sovereign Camp of the Woodman of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S.
66, 75 (1938).
101. See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1915).
102. See, e.g., id. at 672.
103. Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307, 74 P.2d 761 (1937),
aff'd sub norn. Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938) (action determining the right
of the California Insurance Commissioner to liquidate and rehabilitate the party insur-
ance company, which was insolvent and on the brink of bankruptcy, against the wishes
of the plaintiff class of policyholders).
104. Id. at 329, 74 P.2d at 774-75.
105. See notes 199-202 & accompanying text infra.
106. See text accompanying notes 203-206 infra.
107. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
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jurisdictional benefits of a quasi in rem action, it must first bring into
the litigation a res, an asset belonging to the defendant, with the al-
legation that pursuant to a finding of the defendant's liability and
liquidation of his asset, the class is entitled to recover from the pro-
ceeds the amount of its total claim.
This approach, called prejudgment attachment and commonly
used in proceedings against nonresident defendants, 08 has found a
unique application in the New York courts under Seider v. Roth, 0 9
which may answer the consumer class' need for a res. In Seider, the
New York Court of Appeals sanctioned a novel method of obtaining
a res in an attempt to establish a convenient procedure by which a
New York resident can avail himself of a local forum when he has
been injured by the tortious conduct of a nonresident outside New
York." 0  Briefly, the Seider procedure may be analyzed as follows:
(1) Unable to proceed personally against the nonresident tortfeasor,
the New York resident may nevertheless bring suit in a New York
court to determine the nonresident's liability on the basis of quasi in
rem jurisdiction. (2) Such jurisdiction can be established if the non-
resident defendant is insured by a liability insurer doing business in
New York, for the plaintiff may attach the insurer's contractual obli-
gation to defend and indemnify the defendant."' (3) Whatever the
extent of his injuries, the plaintiff cannot recover damages in excess
of the face value of the defendant's liability policy," 2 since in a quasi
in rem proceeding, judgment is limited to the value of the property
attached." 3
The most significant element of Seider's reasoning is that an in-
surer's obligation to defend and indemnify an insured against whom
a tort action has been brought is property within the meaning of an
attachment statute." 4 Arguably, assuming that the insurer was sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction, the Seider rule could be used whenever
the alleged tortfeasor is insured from tort liability. Thus, for example,
108. GREEN, supra note 9, at 37.
109. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
110. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 108-10 (2d Cir. 1968) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the procedure sanctioned by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Seider).
111. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
112. Although this point was not explicitly brought out in Seider, it was stated
by the federal court which construed the Seider procedure in Minichiello v. Rosenberg,
410 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1968).
113. Developments in the Law-ResJudcata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 834 (1952).
114. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113-14, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 101-02 (1966). One of Seider's most adamant critics pointed out that "it]he root
question is, is either the obligation to defend or to indemnify property within the mean-
ing [of New York's attachment statute]?" N.Y. Cirv. PRc. § 5201 (McKinney Supp.
1972).
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in a multistate class action where the class members allegedly suffered
injuries due to a defective product negligently manufactured by the
defendant, the class representative could attach the defendant-manu-
facturer's right to defense and indemnification under its product liabil-
ity insurance policy. The class would then share a common and un-
divided interest in the proceeds of that policy, and under quasi in rem
jurisdiction, each member could be bound by any decision affecting
the status of that policy."'
Although this unique expansion of quasi in rem jurisdiction would
be useful as a means of establishing jurisdiction for multistate con-
sumer class actions, it is necessary to consider whether the Seider rule
can be so transposed from its original context. If one of the purposes
for maintaining a multistate consumer class action is to provide small
claimants a more convenient and feasible method of redress than they
might otherwise have, then this purpose is not at all out of line with
the rationale supporting the Seider decision.'10 However, the Seider
court was motivated solely by its interest in providing relief to New
York residents. Indeed, it has been emphatically announced that only
New York residents can take advantage of the Seider procedure.'
17
This pronouncement is essentially based on the conclusion that in a
Seider-type action brought in a New York court by a nonresident
plaintiff against a nonresident defendant for an injury occurring out-
side New York, a court's "refusal to exercise jurisdiction would be a
permissible application of [the doctrine of] forum non conveniens." '
Thus, there is a question of whether or not this doctrine would be
applicable to a multistate class action wherein the named representa-
tive and a substantial portion of the class are New York residents and
the nonresident members lack any other practical method of redress.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Seider rule, allowing
attachment of liability insurance obligations, has not been applied to
any factual situation which did not closely parallel the original Seider
action." 9 Therefore, even though it is conceivable that the rule could
be extracted from Seider for use in any attachment proceeding brought
against a tortfeasor, it is extremely questionable whether the New
York courts would sanction its use in a multistate consumer class action
115. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
116. See note 110 & accompanying text supra.
117. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 120 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring
opinion on rehearing en banc).
118. Id. at 110 n.6. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court may,
in its discretion, refuse to entertain a case even though jurisdictional and venue require-
ments have been met, if it feels there is no legitimate reason for the case to be brought
in that court." GREEN, supra note 9, at 54.
119. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Victor v.
Lyon Associates, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967);
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
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which shares only one thing in common with the typical Seider ac-
tion-a need to invoke the benefits of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The possibility of adopting the Seider procedure in a multistate
consumer class action outside New York is even more questionable.
A considerable amount of criticism has been leveled against this pro-
cedure. 120  Indeed, with the exception of a recent California lower
court's decision, 121 every federal or state court outside New York
which has considered the question has refused to find attachable prop-
erty in an insurer's obligation to the insured party. 122  In view of
the widespread and notorious unpopularity of Seider, the conclusion
is inescapable that if consumer classes desire the benefit of this case,
they must seek it exclusively in a New York, or possibly California,
forum. It is doubtful that either state would welcome an influx of
consumer-tort class actions resulting from a liberalization of the
Seider rule.
Finally, even if a multistate consumer class could bring a res into
an action, under Seider for example, there are other aspects of a quasi
in rem proceeding which should be considered apart from the binding
nature of its judgment. As suggested earlier, the possible recovery
of damages to the class would be limited by the value of the res, not-
withstanding the total actual damages incurred by the class.' 23 Thus,
the greater the total claim, the less the chance it would be satisfied
by the property attached. Should the class win but recover less than
the amount claimed, the class would not be barred from seeking the
difference in another action.'2 4 Nor would the class be precluded
from proceeding directly against the defendant in a second action if
the class were to lose the initial one.125  But in neither event could
the class again proceed against the particular property which was the
subject matter of the original action.'2 6  Consequently, the class would
120. See, e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents-
New York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Comment, Garnishment of In-
tangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLum. L. REV.
550 (1967); Comment, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19
ST'AN. L. REV. 654 (1967).
121. Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1973).
122. See Kirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971) (Louisiana); Robin-
son v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970) (Pennsylvania); Ricker
v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970); Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701 (La.
1972); State Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1970); Johnson
v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); De Rentis v. Lewis,
106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127
(1970); Housely v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
123. See note 113 & accompanying text supra.




once again be faced with the problems posed by in personam juris-
diction. Moreover, the same problems would arise if the defendant
appeared generally, for the action would then become a personal
one. 
1 27
Jurisdictional Standards of a Class Action
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the minimum
contacts theory and quasi in rem attachment proceedings are not easily
adapted to the consumer class problem. 128  This is not at all surprising
since these theories were developed as jurisdictional principles in ac-
tions involving nonresident defendants, not plaintiff class members. In-
deed, the foregoing analysis effectively emphasizes the earlier observa-
tion that the multistate class action presents a unique challenge to the
concept of in personam jurisdiction. However, when viewed in the
light of the very nature of representative suits, that challenge is not
overwhelming.
A class action must necessarily proceed in the absence of almost
every class member. Therefore, ultimately, the residential makeup
of a class is unimportant. What is important is that the rights of the
absent members be justly protected and that the members be given
an opportunity to be heard if they so desire. 29  These are the essen-
tial requirements of due process, and they must be satisfied in any
class action by .every court, state or federal, regardless of the residences
of the absent class members. Therefore, whereas the essential ele-
ment necessary to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
is some tangible connection between him and the forum state,3 0 the
element necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiff classes
is procedural due process.
That there is indeed a difference between the jurisdictional
standards governing class actions and those governing all other actions
was emphasized long ago by the Supreme Court in the often cited
case of Hansberry v. Lee."' In that case, the Court noted, to the
127. Id.
128. For a discussion of other methods by which courts acquire jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants, but which are inapplicable to the multi-state consumer class sit-
uation, see GREEN, supra note 9, at 26-30.
129. It will be shown that these are constitutional guarantees provided by judicially
developed rules assuring adequate representation by the class representative and proper
notice. See notes 131-151 & accompanying text infra.
130. "It is indeed necessary to due process that steps should be taken calculated
to give the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard; but something more . . .
is necessary. The judgment is valid only when the state has some power, some control
over the defendant." A. SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW
37-38 (1922).
131. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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general rule that only persons subject to a court's jurisdiction are
bound by its judgment, there is a recognized exception for suits of
a representative character. 32 While the Court conceded that the ex-
tent of that exception had not been "precisely defined by judicial opin-
ion,"' 33 it went on to suggest that if a class were adequately repre-
sented, its interest would thereby be protected and the court could
proceed to a final decree."' These pronouncements, although pure
dicta, forecast what was to be an essential requisite of due process
as to absent class members, to wit, adequate representation.
After Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended in 1966,
the federal courts found that adequacy of representation was a crucial
consideration' 35 since the new rule allowed a judgment to bind all
members of the class unless a member affirmatively "opted out" of
the litigation at its commencement.' 36  Consequently, there arose
various guidelines governing the determination of the quality of repre-
sentation in a class suit: (1) "The representative party must be in-
terested enough to be a forceful advocate and his chosen attorney must
be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litiga-
tion.'13 7  (2) "The representative party must have interests which
are compatible with and not antagonistic to those whom he would re-
present."'138  (3) The class representative must be able to show he
suffered injuries similar to those of the other class members.' 39
(4) The number of representatives as compared to the size of the
entire class is not crucial to the question of whether or not the repre-
sentative(s) will adequately protect the class' interests. 40  Thus,
while fair and adequate representation is a prerequisite to any action
132. Id. at 41.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 41-42 (dictum).
135. E.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969). The leading case to emphasize the importance of adequate rep-
resentation is Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968): "Under the new
rule ... as in the case of the old 'true' class action, members of the class not before
the court are bound unless they affirmatively exercise their option to be excluded from
the action. They may find themselves bound even though they were not actually aware
of the proceeding. In such circumstances, the contention that adequate representation
is lacking becomes weighty and 'the interests of the affected persons must be carefully
scrutinized to assure due process of the law for the absent members.'" Id. at 493 (ci-
tation omitted).
136. SeeFED.R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3).
137. Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969).
138. Id. See also Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98,
103 (D. Colo. 1971).
139. See Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1972). This
rule is derived directly from Rule 23 (a) (3).
140. Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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brought under Rule 23,11 the courts, in response to the binding effect
of these actions, have fashioned this requirement into a jurisdictional
standard of due process.
Similarly, the courts have attached particular significance to Rule
23's requirement of notice in 23(b)(3) actions 14 2 due to the finality
accorded them. 4 3  Notice to those whose legal relations are to be af-
fected by a pending action has always been a fundamental requirement
of due process. And, as the Supreme Court suggested in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,14 4 this elementary notion applies
even where the interested parties are so numerous that the task of
notification is a complex one. 14 5 In fact, it is Mullane's constitutional
standard for notice that is incorporated into Rule 23: "the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort." 014  More
importantly, the federal courts view their power to bind a class only
as broad as the extent to which notice can reasonably be expected
to reach absent class members. 47 Consequently, whether a court is
141. Rule 23(a)(4).
142. Rule 23(c)(2). It should be remembered that the class action which is the
subject matter of this comment is that defined by Rule 23(b)(3). See note 7 & ac-
companying text supra.
143. It is initially important to note the basic and obvious importance of notice
in an action which can bind an absent party who has not affirmatively requested exclu-
sion. For a person to decide intelligently whether to participate in an action as a rep-
resented party or to "opt out," he must necessarily receive some form of notice designed
to inform him of: (1) the nature of the action wherein he has been described as a
class member; (2) his right to request exclusion from the action before a specific date;
(3) the possibility of appearing in the action through his own counsel; and (4) the
fact that he will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not, unless he affirm-
atively exercises the options available to him. The guidelines enumerated in Rule 23
(c) (2) (A)-(C) insure that a potential class member will be so advised.
144. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
145. See id. Although Mullane is of precedential value to any type of judicial
proceeding which requires notice, courts sitting in class actions have frequently referred
to this decision by way of emphasizing the individual interest sought to be protected
by the due process requirement of the 14th Amendment. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968); Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combi-
natie Voor Chem. Indus., 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1970). This emphasis
is particularly persuasive since the original Mullane proceeding, although not a class
action, was equally representative in nature. The action was a judicial settlement of
the defendant's trust accounts and was instituted by a special guardian appointed to pro-
tect the interests of the numerous trust beneficiaries.
146. Rule 23(c)(2). What constitutes adequate notice under Rule 23 is in strict
conformity with Mullane's dictate that "[tihe means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."
339 U.S. at 315.
147. See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636-37
(D. Kan. 1968), rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1972).
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deciding if it can allow a class action to proceed or considering the
res judicata effect of a prior class action, the issue of notice is criti-
cal.1
48
Thus, when a federal court is initially satisfied that the due pro-
cess requirements of adequate representation and notice can be met,
it may properly exercise jurisdiction over the entire class.' 49 This is
true whether or not there are class members outside of the court's
normal jurisdictional boundaries."" Yet, even though all state courts
must, and do, afford these same constitutional guarantees in their con-
duct of class actions, none have heretofore invoked the right to expand
their jurisdiction over nonresident class members. 51 It is neverthe-
less the suggestion of this note that by adhering to the same jurisdic-
tional standards of duel process required on the federal level, state
courts can exercise jurisdiction over a class action regardless of the
citizenship of the class members.
This proposal is neither improbable nor radical when placed in
its proper perspective. It would therefore be initially worthwhile to
focus on the sound reasoning underlying the California Supreme
148. For an example of a case in which the court dismissed the class action, seek-
ing to be qualified as a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) action, on the ground inter alia that
no notice could be devised to reach more than a small portion of an extremely large
class, and that even if there were an effective way to reach a majority of the class,
the costs of administering such notice would be prohibitive, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). In Pasquier v.
Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970), a party claimed to be a member of a class
in a prior class action and thereby entitled to the benefit of its judgment despite the
fact that he received no notice of the action during the entire litigation. The court
refused to recognize the res judicata effect of the prior judgment on this particular
party, holding that to dispense with notice, even in actions contemplated by Rule
23(b) (1) or (b) (2), is a violation of due process. Id. at 1352-54.
149. There is a split of authority on the question of whether notice is at all neces-
sary in Rule 23(b) (1) and (b) (2) actions. However, in Rule 23(b) (3) actions, while
some courts find adequate representation more essential than notice, it is uniformly
agreed that notice is nevertheless indispensible. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice
in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
150. While the residential characteristics of a class are seldom discussed by a fed-
eral court, it is reasonable to assume from the various factual circumstances giving rise
to federal class actions, that the court's jurisdiction over an entire class is not affected
by the fact that some members reside outside the state in which the court sits. See,
e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968); City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
Furthermore, even before the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that "in a proper class suit the fact that all members of the class are
not within the jurisdiction of the court where the suit is tried does not exempt foreign
members from the judgment." Advertising Speciality Nat'l Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 238 F.2d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 1956).
151. However, note the two exceptions where the class members had "minimum
contact" with the forum state and where there is a common fund, discussed in notes
80 and 98-104 & accompanying text supra.
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Court's decision of Atkinson v. Superior Court.'152 In the original ac-
tion, a class of musicians, attacking the validity of a collective bargain-
ing agreement between their employers and the union, as well as cer-
tain trust agreements related thereto, sought to enjoin the diversion
of funds earned by then to the nonresident trustee. Although the
trustee was personally served in New York, he failed to appear in Cali-
fornia to defend the action. The trial court held that the trustee was
an indispensible party, as his claim to the monies in question conflicted
with those of the class. Consequently, the court found that it did not
have the power to grant the motion for injunction without personal
jurisdiction over the trustee. On appeal, the California Court issued
a writ of mandate compelling the lower court to assume jurisdiction
over the petitioners' application for a preliminary injunction. It held
that under the relevent statutory provisions, the action was quasi in
rem and, therefore, personal service upon the trustee at his place of
residence was sufficient to empower the court to adjudicate his rights
under the contracts involved.153  This holding was based on the find-
ing that the employers' obligation to make the payments in question
was a chose in action and, as such, personal property within the mean-
ing of the statuory provisions.1
5 4
What was significant in Atkinson, however, was not the ultimate
holding, but rather the manner in which the court justified the exercise
of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Noting the absence of a settled rule gov-
erning the situs of an intangible, Justice Traynor proceeded to find
a solution in the principles governing personal jurisdiction, specifically
the due process requirement of fairness. 55 He concluded that fair-
ness to all the parties demanded that the conflicting claims be subject
to a final adjudication. 15 With this decision the court took another
step toward blurring the distinction traditionally drawn between in
personam and in rem jurisdiction and thereby further expanded the
modern rules governing personal jurisdiction.
15 7
Drawing upon Atkinson, when a jurisdictional problem concern-
ing a nonresident party is raised, a court is obliged to consider and
weigh the equities involved. Jurisdictional rules are not rigid standards
demanding blind conformity. 58 Rather, they are principles which are
malleable within the parameters of due process and should be applied
as fairness dictates. The truth of this fact has been proven by the
152. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 342, 316 P.2d at 963.
155. Id. at 345-47, 316 P.2d at 964-66.
156. Id. at 347, 316 P.2d at 966.
157. See GREEN, supra note 9, at 45 n.160.
158. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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series of decisions in which the Supreme Court significantly expanded
the older and more restrictive limitations of in personam jurisdic-
tion. 5 9 These cases required the Court to consider the various bases
on which the respective state courts had exercised jurisdiction over de-
fendants outside their territorial boundaries. In each case, after satis-
fying itself that provisions had been made which were reasonably cal-
culated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceeding and an
opportunity to be heard, the Court balanced the equities involved to
determine if the state court's jurisdiction theory had satisfied the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" implicit in due
process. 16 0
Accordingly, if a state court, confronted by a multistate class,
mechanically refused to exercise jurisdiction beyond its territorial
boundaries, such a refusal would be an abrogation of its duty as an
administrator of justice. Indeed, before it made any decision as to
the extent of its jurisdictional powers, it would be incumbent upon this
court to consider first if it would be best for all parties concerned to
bring the immediate controversy to a final determination, and if so,
whether the absent class members could be adequately represented
and notified.
A final glimpse at Atkinson may further serve to emphasize the
feasibility of the solution herein proposed. As previously noted, the
Atkinson court sought to avoid multiple litigation of the parties' con-
flicting claims which would have subjected the defendant to possible
double liability.161 Justice Traynor remarked that it was the dou-
159. The traditional limitations of in personam jurisdiction require that the de-
fendant be present within the forum state and that he be served with process while
there. See GREEN, supra note 9, at 26. However, the courts found it necessary to
expand these limitations in order to adjudicate the increasingly frequent controversies
involving defendants beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, in the early case of
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts' non-
resident motorist statute, which provided the registrar of motor vehicles as their agent
for service of process in actions arising out of accidents within Massachusetts involving
said nonresident. Five years later, the Court ruled that citizenship was a sufficient
basis for in personam jurisdiction and permitted service abroad, provided there was a
specific act of Congress authorizing such service and requiring notice to the absent de-
fendant. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). Building on Blackmer, the
Court in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) held that domicile was a sufficient
basis for in personam jurisdiction in the state courts, again provided that there was a
statute authorizing out-of-state service and requiring that the due process requirements
of notice were met. Establishment of the minimum contacts theory in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) was the next major expansion of in per-
sonata jurisdiction. See notes 77-78 & accompanying text supra. This theory itself
was expanded in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) and
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220 (1957). See text accompanying
notes 82-84 supra.
160. See cases cited note 159 supra.
161. See note 156 & accompanying text supra.
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ble liability incurred by the defendant in New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Dunlevy'62 that had prompted the passage of federal inter-
pleader legislation. 63 Under the federal rules of interpleader, once
service of process is made upon a rival claimant, no matter where
he may reside, personal jurisdiction attaches, and the court may pro-
ceed to adjudicate the conflicting claims.16 4  Justice Traynor then
went on to suggest that had the lower court chosen to apply interstate
interpleader jurisdiction as exercised by federal courts in order to sub-
ject the absent trustee to its jurisdiction, it would be doubtful that the
United States Supreme Court would overrule such use of federal proce-
dure on the state level. 165 Before concluding that this decision was
not required of the court, Justice Traynor emphasized the following
point: "A remedy that a federal court may provide without violating
due process of law does not become unfair or unjust because it is
sought in a state court instead."' 66  Admittedly, this pronouncement
is dictum and no more directly dispositive of the class action problem
than Atkinson's formal holdings. However, in the attempt to borrow
the reasoning of Atkinson merely as a means of bringing into focus
the validity of the proposed solution to the class action problem, the
forceful logic of this statement cannot easily be brushed aside. It is
therefore submitted that if a federal court can constitutionally exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a class in a Rule 23 action, so can a
state court in a similar action, particularly when fairness to the parties
so demands.
Practical Limitations of the Proposed Solution
While state courts theoretically have the power to hear a multi-
state class action, under what circumstances realistically will they be
able and willing to exercise this power? The answer, as it applies
to consumer class actions, depends on four variables: (1) the states'
class action law and their respective postures toward class actions; (2)
the nature of the controversy and the relief sought; (3) the interest
162. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
163. 49 Cal. 2d at 347-48, 316 P.2d at 966. "In [Dunlevy], there were rival
claimants to the cash surrender value of a policy. The company brought an inter-
pleader action in Pennsylvania, paying the amount into court, and asking the court to
decide to whom it was owed. One of the claimants lived in Pennsylvania, the other
in California. The court found for the Pennsylvania claimant. In a later suit in Cali-
fornia by the other claimant, the court found for her. On appeal to the Supreme Court
it held that the Pennsylvania court had no jurisdiction to pass on the rights of the Cali-
fornia claimant. In other words, there was no in rem jurisdiction. . . . The result
was that the company had to pay twice." GREEN, supra note 9, at 42.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970).
165. 49 Cal. 2d at 348, 316 P.2d at 966 (dictum).
166. Id.
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of a court to hear the action; and (4) the size of the class. There
is an optimum of each of these variables which must exist before a
multistate consumer class can expect to be accepted in a state court.
State Class Action Provisions
The degree to which a state court can respond to the needs of
consumer classes is directly proportionate to the type of class action
rules existing in each state, as well as the attitude of each state toward
the class action device. While it is beyond the scope of this article
to present a detailed analysis of the status of the class action on the
state level, a brief statistical summary would be of value. This sum-
mary is based on an excellent and prodigious article 67 published in
1969 which represents the most recent available analysis of class ac-
tion law on a state-by-state basis.
There are seven states which have a common law (non-statutory)
variety of class action.168  It appears to be the present position of five
of these states to limit class suits to relief in equity, although a legal
cause may be joined if sufficiently collateral. 69  Moreover, there is
some indication that class actions might be permissible only in such
instances where joinder is compulsory.1 70 This would mean that in
order for the class action to proceed, the court must find that the ab-
sent class members were indispensible to the action.17 ' However, the
common law jurisdictions have not yet expressly adopted this disadvan-
tageous restriction.' 7 2 On the whole, it is apparent that no matter how
favorable their attitudes toward class actions in general, these seven
states provide less than, adequate forums for the typical consumer
class, whose claims cannot always be satisfied in equity, 7 3 and whose
members are not usually indispensible to the maintenance of the ac-
tion.
The 1848 Field Code class action has served as a model for six-
teen states' class action provisions. 4  These statutes are clearly distin-
guishable from those of other jurisdictions by the generality of their
terms. A typical example is California's statute:
167. Starrs, supra note 1.
168. Id. at 425, listing Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ten-
nessee, Vermont, Virginia.
169. Id. at 427.
170. Id. at 427-28.
171. Compulsory joinder requires a finding that the interests of the absent parties
would be impaired or impeded, or that the defendant would be subject to a risk of mul-
tiple liability if the action was not allowed. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
172. Starrs, supra note 1, at 427-28.
173. See note 14 supra.
174. Starrs, supra note 1, at 433-34, listing Alabama, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Wisconsin.
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[A]nd when the question is one of a common or general interest,
of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is im-
practicable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all.
175
The Field Code provisions are markedly different from the other
states' provisions in that they rely solely on the two requirements of
numerous parties and common questions of law or fact. 17 6  While this
latter requirement has led to a dispute in a few states over the applica-
tion of the compulsory joinder standard to class actions, a trend away
from this impediment has recently surfaced. 17 7  Finally, due to the
lack of express guidelines governing class proceedings, a substantial
number of these jurisdictions have judicially adopted the class action
rules developed by the federal courts to meet the requirements of Rule
23.118 Thus, in these forums, the broad scope of the class action de-
vice offers an attractive invitation to consumer class litigation . Indeed,
there are several among the Field Code forums that have been particu-
larly receptive to consumer class actions, for example California 179 and
Wisconsin. 8" However, the attitude of the New York Court of Ap-
peals toward consumer class actions, which has recently been de-
scribed as "general skepticism, bordering on hostility," 8' partially re-
duces the optimism generated by the foregoing treatment of the Field
Code statutes.
The next category consists of class action rules patterned after
the 1938 Federal Rule 23, which exist in somewhat varying form in
twenty-six jurisdictions. 82 Unfortunately, there is little similarity be-
175. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382 (West 1973).
176. Compare id. with ME. R. Civ. P. 23 (1964).
177. Starrs, supra note 1, at 434-36.
178. E.g., Carlson v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 640, 109 Cal. Rptr. 240
(1973) (class members given opportunity to opt out); State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett,
194 So. 2d 452, 454 (La. App. 1966) (citing criteria for adequate representation);
Miles v. New Jersey Motors, 32 Ohio App. 2d 350, 291 N.E.2d 758 (1972) (class ac-
tion must meet all prerequisites of Rule 23).
179. See McCall, Consumer Protection-A New Field for a New Day, 34 AM.
TRIAL LAW. L.J. 136, 145-47 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCall].
180. Starrs, supra note 1, at 462-63.
181. McCall, supra note 179, at 147, discussing Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d
396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970). The Hall court dismissed the action,
following a line of New York cases barring class actions brought by persons whose
causes of action arose out of distinct transactions, even though the transactions in ques-
tion were similar and there was a single defendant. For a brief critical analysis of
Hall, see Eckhardt, supra note 2, at 664-66.
182. Starrs, supra note 1, at 469, listing Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Note that
Alabama, New Mexico, and North Carolina have provisions modeled after both the
Field Code and the 1938 Rule 23. See note 174 supra. In ten of the above listed
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tween the 1938 Rule and the present Rule 23. The law of these
states is mired in the confusing tripartite classification of class actions
which arose in equity and were subsequently fostered by judicial con-
struction of the 1938 Rule."8 Under the law of most of these states,
the type of relief sought, and, hence, the ultimate success of maintain-
ing the action, depends a great deal upon whether the action is classi-
fied as "true," "hybrid" or "spurious." 18 4  Since it is often difficult
to characterize class actions in this manner, one court may apply one
classification to a particular action, and another court may apply a con-
trary classification to virtually the same type of action. Consequently,
there have been diverse and often contradictory decisions, not only
between the different states, but also within a single forum. 5 It is
reasonable to say that the consumer advocate is denied the comfort
of any uniformity of law governing class actions in these particular for-
ums. Furthermore, under the 1938 Rule 23, the spurious class action
lacks the binding effect on absentees accorded the present-day Rule
23(b)(3) action.' 8 6 Thus, the conclusiveness of spurious class actions
in the states under discussion has long been a subject of debate 1 '7
However, despite the problems raised by the 1938 Rule, the bur-
dens placed on the consumer class are more troublesome than over-
whelming. Recent statutory provisions giving a number of these juris-
dictions wide discretion in the administration of class actions are
gradually eroding the nonbinding effect of the spurious suit, since they
allow the issuance of preliminary judicial orders protecting the rights
of absentees.' s  More importantly, because there is a trend among
the states which adopted the 1938 Federal Rules to revise their proce-
dures in conformity with the 1966 federal amendments, there is rea-
son to hope that these states "will similarly liberalize their class statutes
through amendment or judicial interpretation along the lines of the
1966 revision of Rule 23. '' 89
As a final category, there are at least three states which have
adopted the current Rule 23.190 However, in these states there have not
states, there is a noticeable absence of meaningful case law. However, Professor Starts
sees the possibility of these states allowing consumer class actions on a limited basis.
See Starrs, supra note 1, at 471-72.
183. See generally MooRE, supra note 4, at I 23.08-.10.
184. See Starrs, supra note 1, at 463-67. For a discussion of the old tripartite
classification of class actions, see generally MooR, supra note 4.
185. Id.
186. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). The Rule 23(b)(3) action is the vestige of
the spurious class action. MooRE, supra note 4.
187. See Starrs, supra note 1, at 467-70. Typically, the issue is whether class
members who do not affirmatively exclude themselves from an action will be bound
by a judgment unfavorable to the class.
188. Id. at 468-69.
189. McCall, supra note 179, at 144.
190. Starrs, supra note 1, at 491, listing Arizona, Minnesota, Washington. Also,
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been a sufficient number of decisions reported from which to deter-
mine the respective courts' interpretation of their class action rules.
Upon eventual judicial review, it is doubtful that Rule 23 actions will
receive any less favorable treatment in these states than it has received
on the federal level.191 On the contrary, unencumbered by the Snyder
aggregation bar which exists on the federal level, Rule 23(b)(3) ac-
tions in these forums may very well become important means of re-
dressing group wrongs, including consumer abuses.
Nature of the Class Action Controversy and the Relief Sought
Not only are each state's class action provisions important to the
maintenance of a multistate consumer class action, but so are its stat-
utes which are applicable to consumer controversies. Naturally, pro-
duct liability class actions sounding in tort or actions based on fraud,
misrepresentation, or breach of contract will all find bases in common
law principles. However, it is sometimes difficult to adapt the require-
ments of proof for such controversies to class action litigation. For
instance, some courts have dismissed actions complaining of deceptive
sales practices on the grounds that this type of suit requires individual
proof of reliance by each class member on the allegedly fraudulent
representations of the defendant and such proof is virtually impossible
without bringing each class member into court. 192
With such problems inherent in a class action based on the com-
mon law, a consumer class action is greatly expedited when there
exists special legislation on which to base the suit. In recent years,
the states have enacted numerous statutes which are designed to pre-
vent consumer exploitation and which provide for private redress in
the courts.' 93 For example, almost forty percent of the states have
passed some form of comprehensive consumer fraud legislation.' 4
Although only seven of these states have expressly provided for private
litigation, there is some indication that the other states will imply from
their respective statutory provisions that private consumers have stand-
ing to sue.' 95 Unfortunately, the remaining states, which have not en-
acted some type of blanket consumer legislation, have approached con-
at the writing of the Starrs article, New Jersey had proposed the adoption of the pre-
sent Rule 23. Id.
191. See notes 15-27 & accompanying text supra.
192. E.g., Osceola Groves, Inc. v. Wiley, 78 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1955); Rice v. Snar-
lin, 131 Ill. App. 434, 443, 266 N.E.2d 183, 189 (1970); Richards v. Kaskel, 40 A.D.
2d 804, 338 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1972). Contra Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800,
484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) (reliance was presumed).
193. McCall, supra note 179, at 136.
194. Id. at 141.
195. Id. at 141-42.
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sumer problems in a piecemeal fashion. 190 Therefore, there is con-
siderable variation in consumer laws in these latter jurisdictions.
Finally, it should be remembered that some states have limited
class actions to equitable relief, with the possibility of joining collateral
legal causes. 197  And, as previously noted, equity is not always an ap-
propriate remedy for consumer wrongs. 9 ' Clearly, legislators must
soon respond to consumer demands for appropriate and comprehem
sive legislation. However, until they do, success in maintaining a
multistate consumer class action in any one state can depend entirely
on the law available on which to base the action and the type of relief
requested.
Interest of the Court to Hear the Action
Generally, when a state court exercises its jurisdiction beyond the
traditional limits, it has been compelled to do so by a special inter-
est(s) involved in the litigation. The interest may represent that of
the government and/or the citizens of the state in which the court
sits.' 99 And at other times, the court's primary concern is protection
of an individual's interest.10 Thus, for example, in Hess v. Paw-
loski,201 the Supreme Court approved the Massachusetts Supreme
Court's holding that, under that state's nonresident motorist statute,
a nonresident defendant can be required to defend an action in Massa-
chusetts arising out of an in-state automobile accident between himself
and a resident. This decision was based on the finding that the state's
interest, in promoting care on the part of all who used its highways,
outweighed any inconvenience a nonresident motorist might suffer in
having to come to Massachusetts to defend an action.202
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that before a court would
agree to maintain a multistate consumer class action, it would have
to find that there were interests which deserved protection and which
justified an exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident class mem-
196. See, e.g., Comment, Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current Methods and
Some Proposals for Reform, 68 MIc. L. REV. 926, 931 (1970).
197. See note 169 & accompanying text supra.
198. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
199. E.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
643 (1950) (noting state's interest in all insurance policies which protect its citizens
against risk); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (recognizing
state's interest in collecting taxes); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (noting
state's interest in controlling use of its highways).
200. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Atkinson
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied sub nom. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
201. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
202. Id. at 356.
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bers. To predict all the possible interests that may be involved in
such an action would indeed be difficult, since the interests would ob-
viously vary with the particular facts of each case. However, there
are some which immediately suggest themselves. For example, as an
office of the state in which it sits, a court always has an interest in
protecting the rights of the citizens of that state. Thus, if a majority
of the members of a multistate class were residents of the forum state,
a court might be inclined to hear the whole action. On the other
hand, it should be noted that a court, having the power to dismiss par-
ties over which it recognizes no jurisdiction, presumably can dismiss the
claims of the nonresidents, while retaining thosel of the local class
members.
Unlike its responsibility towards residents, a court does not have
a preexisting duty to protect the rights of citizens of another state.
However, once a nonresident becomes party to an action before the
court, that duty does arise. Therefore, in a multistate class action,
the question will be whether a court could better protect the rights
of nonresident members by hearing their claims or by "sending them
back" to their respective state courts. If the nonresident portion of
a class were viewed on a state-by-state basis and the number of class
members from each of the foreign states were relatively small, fairness
might dictate that they be allowed to remain in the action.2"3 The
rationale for this supposition rests on one of the basic purposes of the
class action device, to expedite the disposition of otherwise unredress-
able grievances.20 4 In the hypothetical class action just posed, should
a court refuse to include the foreign class members, it is possible their
grievances may go unheard. If their claims were indeed small, they
would not warrant the costs of individual litigation. Moreover, there
may be an insufficient number of members in any one of the states
represented to effectively organize another class action. On the other
hand, there is the possibility that the interest of a foreign class member
would best be served by the laws of his own state. For example, there
may arise a conflict between the law of the nonresident's state and
the law of the forum, the resolution of which would result in a more
favorable treatment of the foreign class member in the courts of his
own state.
The defendant in a multistate class action may also provide a
court with sufficient reason to proceed to a final adjudication of the
entire controversy. In a consumer class action, there is always the
possibility that a defendant may be subjected to numerous subsequent
203. This proposition calls for an application of the same doctrine of "fairness to
all parties" which was employed by the Atkinson court. See notes 155-160 & accom-
panying text supra.
204. See note 2 supra.
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actions should the court dismiss the claims of the foreign class mem-
bers. This, coupled with a court's commitment to judicial economy,
may be a convincing reason for the court to hear the whole action.
Furthermore, if the defendant were incorporated or had its principal
place of business in the forum state, its citizenship in that state would
perhaps compound the court's interest in protecting it from possible
vexatious litigation. The defendant's position may be viewed from
even another perspective. Should the court refuse to hear the entire
action and should it appear that the foreign class members could not
reasonably pursue their claims on their own, the defendant may never
be required to answer totally for his alleged misconduct.
Finally, the nature of the action might be such that public interest
would demand its immediate and final resolution. This is often the
case in actions involving public fiduciaries, such as insurance compan-
ies. 205 Likewise, as previously indicated, in upholding various statutes
which promote safety on the highways, courts have taken notice of
the public's need for protection from inherently dangerous activities. 216
Thus, perhaps a court may find a similar need to protect the general
public if, for example, the defendant were alleged to have wilfully dis-
persed a defective product of fairly common use.
While hardly exhaustive of the topic, the foregoing hypotheticals
are illustrative of the fact that in multistate class actions, there may
be any number of interests which will require the court's attention.
Thus, drawing upon the Atkinson rationale, a "mechanical" applica-
tion of traditional jurisdictional rules is precluded.20 7  On the contrary,
when faced by the novel jurisdictional problem of a multistate class
action, state courts will find it necessary to balance the equities in-
volved before reaching a decision, just as they have done in the past
in situations involving nonresident defendants.20 8 Moreover, while it
is clear that a court must discern a need for exercising jurisdiction over
the entire class, that need does not have to be of such overriding pro-
portions that it would rarely arise. Rather, the test that the court must
ultimately apply, after finding interests deserving of its protection, is
whether maintenance of the action would in any way offend the "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" implicit in due pro-
cess. 20
9
Size of the Class
Actions have been maintained where class numbers ranged from
205. E.g., Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307, 74 P.2d 761
(1937), affd sub nom. Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938).
206. See notes 155-156 & accompanying text supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 158-160 supra.
208. See cases cited note 159 supra.
209. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
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hundreds21 ° to thousands.21' Generally, the larger the class, the more
likely the membership becomes open-ended, in that the number of
members can only be approximated. Likewise, as the class size be-
comes greater, the possibility of identifying the individual members is
greatly reduced. However, unless increased membership results in a
completely amorphous class, neither of these factors is reason to dis-
miss an action. What is essential to existence of a class is that
its descriptive boundaries be precisely drawn. 12  This requires that
the class representative specify the exact nature of the alleged miscon-
duct and resultant injuries, as well as the facts from which the class
can be ascertained. These facts would necessarily include the approx-
imate dates and places of the misconduct and the approximate number
and location of the class members. When a class is adequately de-
fined, a subsequent judgment will bind all members coming within the
class' description. 13
There is no doubt that even an extremely large class is sufficient-
ly capable of precise definition. 214  However, as class size increases,
the feasibility of actually notifying the class members of the pending
litigation decreases. Under the theory proposed in this note the due
process requirement of notice reasonably calculated to reach the ab-
sent class members, is crucial to a court's exercise of jurisdiction over
nonresidents in a class.21 5 What constitutes reasonable notice can only
be determined on a case by case basis.
When individual class numbers can be identified, a court will re-
quire that they be sent personal notice by mail.216 A typical proce-
dure for identifying potential class members is for the court to require
the class representative to submit a proposed list of persons to whom
notice should be sent.21 However, there are occasions when the de-
fendant can more readily supply this information. Oftentimes, the de-
fendant may be aware of the identities of potential class members due
210. See, e.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98 (D.
Colo. 1971); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1971).
211. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Il. 1970), aff'd, 403
U.S. 901 (1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
I1. 1969).
212. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967) (if the existence of an ascertainable class is shown, no need exists to identify
the individual members in order to bind all members by the judgment).
213. MooRE, supra note 4, at 23.11.
214. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 307 U.S. 648 (1939).
215. See text accompanying notes 142-151 supra.
216. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20
(1950).
217. See, e.g., Weiss v, Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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to the previous contact he has had with them which has given rise
to the suit. If this is the case, he may be obliged to compile the list
of those to receive notice.218  For example, a defendant retailer,
accused of having sold defective or fraudulently advertised goods to
the members of a consumer class, may have in his possession records
of those sales. If these records contained the names of his past cus-
tomers, they would be used by the court for the purposes of notifica-
tion.
Nonetheless, the fact that even a substantial number of the class
are incapable of identification is not fatal to a class action. 219 Indeed,
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,220 the Supreme
Court noted that "[piersonal service has not in all circumstances been
regarded as indispensible to the process due to residents [of the forum
state], and it has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresi-
dents."'2 2 ' Thus, when class members cannot be identified through
reasonable effort, resort to publication of notice in appropriate news-
papers is constitutionally permissible.222 Furthermore, in view of the
scope of communication achieved by radio and television, there is rea-
son to believe that courts may find these media more effective for this
particular form of notification.
2 3
In its concern to deal fairly with the rights of the foreign class
members, a court confronted by a multistate class may be influenced
by the number of unidentifiable class members to a greater extent than
is constitutionally necessary. Consequently, where it may allow notice
by publication for the benefit of unidentifiable resident class members,
it may be more reluctant to supervise the same type of notice in order
to reach unidentifiable class members residing in any number of places
outside the forum state. Indeed, there would be a point at which no-
tice to the thousands of potential class members scattered among the
several states could not reasonably be accomplished. Thus, -the state
court is faced with another crucial balancing of equities before it can
decide to what extent, if any, it will exercise jurisdiction over a multistate
class. The greater the identifiable membership, the better the possibility
of protecting their individual interests. Accordingly, the court may
decide to hear the whole action. As a class becomes larger, it be-
218. See, e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
219. See note 212 supra.
220. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
221. Id. at314.
222. Id. at 317-18.
223. In some of the recent suits concerning antibiotics, where little response was
received after settlement notices were published in the major newspapers across the
country, the lawyers were allowed to broadcast public service announcements regarding
the settlement on radio and television. Miller, supra note 149, at 321.
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comes more likely that a court would dismiss the nonresidents' claims
and recommend subclasses be formed along state lines. 224  Naturally,
within these two extremes is the third possibility of partial dismissal
as to certain portions of the nonresident membership.
Before concluding the topic of class size, it is necessary to con-
sider briefly its effect on other issues raised by class actions. A deci-
sion to dismiss a class action is often based on the finding that the
litigation would be too unmanageable.22 5 Dismissal for this reason
could be due to any one or a combination of problems, such as the
difficulties in allocating the costs and administrative duties of notice,
the feasibility of distributing recoveries to individual class members,
and the overburdening of court resources.226 Naturally, these prob-
lems will become more acute with increase in the class size and
greater geographic dispersal of class members.
It would be naive to contend that administration of a multistate
consumer class action would not be a complex and difficult procedure.
Yet, whatever dimensions such an action adds to the already complex
nature of the class suit, they do not warrant a summary dismissal of
the action. Indeed, as in any class action, a court would be obliged
to evaluate carefully the feasibility of adopting workable procedures
to meet the peculiarities of the action. There is always the ingenuity
of counsel to aid the court in this regard, as well as the availability
of modem computer techniques and the mass media.127  In addition,
the court would need to determine whether or not the administrative
costs of the suit would justify its continuance in view of the pecuniary
benefit the class hopes to gain.228  Therefore, only after such an eval-
uation is conducted could a court render a fair determination on the
issue of manageability.
In upholding consumer class actions by seven states based on anti-
trust violations arising from sales of antibiotics, the federal district court
224. One commentator has insisted that dismissal of all foreign class members'
claims is, indeed, the only alternative a state court has when confronted with a multi-
state class action (regardless of its size). He goes on to suggest, however, that under
the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, class actions against the same de-
fendant for the same alleged injuries brought on a state-by-state basis would have the
same deterrent effect upon future consumer abuses as would a multi-state action in a
single forum. Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adjudica-
tions to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1002 (1971).
225. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
414 U.S. 908 (1973); School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
226. See generally Newberg, supra note 68, at 227-34.
227. See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
228. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414
U.S. 908 (1973).
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for the southern district of New York remarked in reference to the
problems of manageability:
It is obvious . . . that the only manner in which the plaintiff class
can ever prosecute their claims is by a Rule 23 class action and
the court cannot simply close the doors on these litigants because
their actions present novel and difficult questions. 29
Hopefully, this same approach to the issue of manageability will pre-
vail in the state forums when circumstances dictate the maintenance
of a multistate class action.
Conclusion
It is clear that if the class action device is to achieve a greater
degree of viability, it will have to be on the state level.230 Further-
more, once it is recognized that this device is particularly suited to
curb consumer abuses, 31 it is unreasonable to confine its use to local
grievances. There will undoubtably be numerous occasions when the
interests of the consuming public would best be served by allowing
multistate actions to proceed in a single forum. It has been suggested
herein that such an approach is possible when adequate representation
and reasonable notice can be provided for the protection of the absent
class members. However, the unique issues raised by a multistate
consumer class action cannot always be resolved in favor of its main-
tenance. Hence, this proposed solution to the typical consumer class'
jurisdictional problem is applicable only on a limited basis.
A wider acceptance of multistate consumer class actions in the
state courts necessarily depends on the progressive attitudes of the
makers and administrators of law. It remains the unfortunate fact tha
despite the nation's current awareness of the need to protect the con-
sumer, he is still the constant victim of overcharges, usurious interest
rates, defective products and deceptive advertising. 32 Certainly, state
governments cannot long avoid the public's demand for more effective
consumer legislation.
Similarly, the fact that class actions are extremely appealing from
the standpoint of justice cannot be ignored. It is to be hoped that
229. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, Con-
sumer Class Actions, Opinion No. 2 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 4, 1971), cited in Newberg,
supra note 68, at 229.
230. See text accompanying notes 15-72 supra.
231. See note 3 supra.
232. See generally R. CHARELL, How I TumN ORINARY COMPLAINTS INTO THOU-
SANDS OF DOLLARS: THE DiARY OF A TOUGH CONSUMER (1973). In a recent inter-
view, Mr. Charell, an attorney and television executive, stated: "The nation is filled
with consumer atrocity stories. We've become a country of bad goods and incredibly
bad service. Now the customer is often treated as the enemy." San Francisco Exam-
iner, Jan. 27, 1974, "Sunday Scene," at 6, cols. 3-5.
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the states which presently have rather restrictive class action proce-
dures will adopt more liberal rules. Moreover, every state which in-
tends to provide its citizens with this device will have to confront the
problems of manageability.2 33  There are those in the legal commun-
ity, judges, practitioners and professors alike, who knowledgably insist
that these problems are not insurmountable. 234  Therefore, lacking a
more effective means of dealing with mass-produced wrongs, the state
judiciaries and legislatures must make a combined and concerted effort
to fashion the class action into a workable procedure, one which is
consistently available to groups who seek its benefits. With such
effort, state courts will be better able to exercise their constitutional
power and assume jurisdiction over multistate consumer class actions
when circumstances so require.
Andrea R. Martin*
233. The Los Angeles Superior Court has already attempted to deal with this prob-
lem. Judge David Thomas has prepared a manual which embodies "pragmatic proce-
dural devices . . . to simplify the potentially complex (class) litigation while at the
same time protecting the rights of all the parties." Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL,
MANUAL FOR THE CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON CLASS ACTION IssuEs 5 (April
3, 1973), citing Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 820, 484 P.2d 964, 977,
94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809 (1971).
234. See, e.g., Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substan-
tive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973); Newberg, supra note 68; Weinstein, Some Reflections
on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299 (1973).
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